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ABSTRACT
Terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and al-Qa’ida in
the Arabian Peninsula, produce videos to disseminate their messages. Even though there are
many studies closely examining the text in jihadi videos, there are fewer studies that examine
multimodal messages, specifically the audiovisual messages. This study aims to examine the
audiovisual messages in videos produced by three jihadi groups: the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP.
This research attempts to answer the following strategic questions. One, what are some common
themes in propaganda videos produced by the Taliban, ISIS, and al-Qa’ida? Two, how does each
group utilize different Sonic Modes in common themes? Three, how do the three jihadi groups
compare in their utilization of different Sonic Modes? Some of the findings include the
utilization of specific common themes amongst the three groups, and these groups differ in their
utilization of the audiovisual messages.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, terrorist organizations have become particularly skillful at producing
multimedia videos as a way to disseminate their messages but also, and this has become more
apparent since the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (variously referred to as ISIS, ISIL,
or Daesh), to incite political violence. When examining jihadi videos, communication strategies,
specifically the audiovisual information-sharing channel, become easily perceptible that thus far
have not gathered much attention. Even though there are studies that closely examine the text in
jihadi videos (Mahood & Rane, 2017) or the utilization of jihadi music in media products
(Gråtrud, 2016; Lahoud, 2017; Lahoud & Pieslak, 2018; Pieslak, 2015, 2017; Pieslak & Lahoud,
2018), there are fewer studies (Allendorfer & Herring, 2015; Winkler & Pieslak, 2018) that
examine audiovisual communication strategy in jihadi videos.
Jihadi organizations recognize the benefits of exploiting different communication strategies
in their videos to disseminate their messages and “consolidating media power as a necessary step
for accomplishing the end goals of the group.” (Winkler & Pieslak, 2018) Some of these
communication strategies used extensively in jihadi videos include using different sonic
elements, such as music utilization, prerecorded or live, alongside battleground and nonbattleground sounds. The added value of sonic elements (Chion, 2019) reinforces the visual
content by encouraging increased individual understanding and recall (Drew & Grimes, 1987;
Graber, 1996) of the jihadi group’s primary messages (Winkler & Pieslak, 2018). Specifically,
combining sonic elements with visual content makes the experience more enjoyable (Chion,
2019) and memorable (Graber, 1996). Therefore, pictures integrated with words, particularly
dramatic pictures, make the message more memorable than pictures combined with text (Graber,
1996). The prominence of rich sonic elements in media products is well recognized by many
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extremist organizations, such as al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hizb ut Tahrir (Lemieux & Nill,
2011), Hammerskin Nation, Hale’s Creativity Movement Christian Radicals (Pieslak, 2015), the
Taliban, and ISIS.
Analyzing the visual content used by the Taliban, ISIS, and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula or AQAP in the videos entails establishing common themes utilized in these videos,
and to this end, several themes have been identified. Such themes include Military Training,
Martyrdom, Conquest and Military Operation, Oppression and Suffering, Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah1, or martyrdom operation, Punishment and Execution, and Power Projection.
Across all videos analyzed, each group utilizes different sonic techniques, such as music
utilization in the background, foreground, or live singing, battleground and non-battleground
sounds, and vocalization. Therefore, this study aims to examine the audiovisual messaging
strategies in videos produced by the three jihadi groups.
By exploring a total of 118 videos produced by the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP, this research
contributes to the growing field that examines multimodal communication strategies of jihadi
videos by offering an understanding of some of the common themes and audiovisual
communication messages used by the three jihadi groups in their videos. Studying audiovisual
communication strategies is of vital importance because of not only the ability of information to
reach a broader and younger audience but also the ability of audiovisual messages to enhance
memory and increase their memorability (Graber, 1996). In jihadi videos, those who examine the
interaction between multimodal elements attempt to find the group’s strategic themes, preferred
messaging strategies (Winkler & Pieslak, 2018), and how they present their messages

Amaliyat inghimasiyah (plural), amaliyah inghimasiyah (singular) meaning a martyrdom operation or immersing
operation.
1
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(Allendorfer & Herring, 2015) to a shared audience. Also, studies that examine jihadi imagery
and text production through multimodal analysis attempt to find how extremist groups use
semiotic messages to incite violence, influence potential online recruits, and legitimize their
views (O’Halloran et al., 2019).
Despite great contributions from other studies in the field of visual analysis and the
interaction of multimodal communication strategies in jihadi videos, there is a lack in the
comparative analysis of audiovisual communication messages used in videos produced by the
Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP. Therefore, this research attempts to fill in the gap by answering the
following strategic questions. One, what are some common themes in propaganda videos
produced by the Taliban, ISIS, and al-Qa’ida? Two, how does each group utilize different Sonic
Modes in common themes? Three, how do the three jihadi groups compare in their utilization of
different Sonic Modes? By answering these questions, this research is adding to the broader
literature that examines multimodal communication messages by establishing common strategic
themes and comparing the audiovisual communication strategies in videos produced by the three
jihadi groups. Additionally, the results of this study help analysts, policymakers, scholars, and
online responders recognize some of the common themes utilized by the three groups and
understand how each of these groups use the audiovisual information-sharing channel and the
observed differences between them.
While such research has an underlying value of establishing common strategic themes used
in videos disseminated by the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP, there should be a growing need to study
multimodal communication messages in jihadi videos. A multimodal analysis is best used to
understand what lies beyond the surface analysis of content or platform (Wignell et al., 2017)
and produce a better understanding of the different communication toolkit used by jihadi
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organizations in their media campaigns. Despite the fact that there are studies that examine
multimodal interactions of jihadi media campaigns (Allendorfer & Herring, 2015; Al-Rawi &
Jiwani, 2017; Chouliaraki & Kissas, 2018; O’Halloran et al., 2019; Wignell et al., 2017),
especially the contributions of Winkler and Pieslak’s audiovisual study of ISIS videos, this study
adds to multimodal studies by examining the audiovisual messages in videos produced by the
Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP, and compares the similarities and difference between group’s
utilization of sonic elements within common themes. Even though the three groups utilize similar
Sonic Modes in their videos to reinforce common themes, there are discrepancies within the
utilization of common themes and sonic elements in the videos. Such discrepancies imply that
the groups are of different nature and with different aims and goals. The oversight of studying
communication strategies of jihadi media campaign may risks, as has been established by
Allendorfer and Herring’s study, overlooking how jihad groups present their messages using
dynamic communication strategies towards a targeted audience. Therefore, when countering
violent extremism, analysts can apply more comprehensive methods for a more accurate
understanding of extremist communication strategies to create effective, result-oriented counterpropaganda messages.
This thesis is divided into several sections starting with a literature review, the purpose of
which is to introduce the concept and significance of multimodality and explore one of the most
prominent sonic elements used in jihadi videos, i.e., jihadi anashid. This is followed by an
explanation of the methodology used in the study and followed by subsections of detailed
interpretations of the results.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

The bulk of studies to date that examine jihadi media campaigns focus on exploring a single
communication strategy by studying either videos, images, text, or music. Many studies are
focusing on visual or imagery content analysis (Euben, 2017; Friis, 2015; Hafez, 2007; Mahood
& Rane, 2017; Ramsay, 2013; Stenersen, 2017; Winkler et al., 2019, 2020), and some focus on
the textual analysis of jihadi poetry (Creswell & Haykel, 2017). Others, on the other hand,
examine sonic elements of jihadi media products (Frishkopf, 2000; Gråtrud, 2016; Lahoud,
2017; Lahoud & Pieslak, 2018; Pieslak, 2015, 2017; Pieslak et al., 2019; Pieslak & Lahoud,
2018; Weinreich & Pelevin, 2012). Even though multimodal studies of jihadi media campaigns
hold a promising future, to date, there are fewer studies aimed at exploring jihadi multimodal
communication messages (Allendorfer & Herring, 2015; Al-Rawi & Jiwani, 2017; Chouliaraki
& Kissas, 2018; O’Halloran et al., 2019; Wignell et al., 2017; Winkler & Pieslak, 2018).
Since the use of multimodal messages creates a dynamic method of information sharing, one
contemplates how is multimodality defined, and why is it significant when studying jihadi
videos. Lemke defines multimodal discourse analysis (Gee & Handford, 2012) as “set of
techniques for making connections between texts and their meaning,” in which, the text is not
only words, but it can also denote visual forms of communication, such as diagrams, images,
sound effects and music, full-motion videos, etc. (Lemke, 2012, p.79). Therefore, language is a
multimodal semiotic system in which the interaction between the signs and symbols can deploy
and construct more complex meaning (Lemke, 2012) and can exist in two, three, or four
dimensions (Kress, 2012). Lemke describes all information-making channels, visual, sound,
symbols, etc., as multimodal, especially information sharing through videos. Video is a
“multimedia and multichannel technology” in which its content is multimodal and dynamic
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through the combination of “action, language, non-speech sound effects, and visual semiotics”
that contribute to the creation of a real-time sense of what is going on (Lemke, 2012, p.83).
Accordingly, multimodal messages have meanings beyond the capabilities of traditional
language and denote various ways of communication, such as visual, sonic, and other semiotic
means (Jewitt, 2014).
This study focuses on the sonic and visual elements in videos produced by the Taliban, ISIS,
and AQAP because audio and visual elements enhance our understanding of information
transmission and processing capabilities (Graber, 1996). Information shared through the
audiovisual channel encourages memory enhancement due to the effects generated by combining
pictures with sound, which in essence make the information more memorable and recoverable
than information shared solely through audio or text (Graber, 1996; Grimes, 1990). Thus, the
merging of multimodality is more powerful because a single modal information-sharing channel
leaves a “blind spot in our visualization in media (Cook, 2015, p.126), and multimodal channels
are more immersive and powerful.
Furthermore, there is an essential relationship between the visual and audio elements
because the sound has an added value that gives the image a definite impression, which
contributes to creating a better-remembered experience of the content (Chion, 2019). Chion adds
that there are two ways or effects in which the added value can create emotions with the visual
image; empathetic and anempathetic effects. Empathetic effect of sound–derived from empathy–
is when sound, such as music, can directly express its participation in the scene’s tone, rhythm,
and phrasing, which in turn can invoke emotions, such as sadness, happiness, and movement.
Additionally, Chion describes the anempathetic effect of sound is intensifying emotions by
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progressing in a “steady, undaunted, and ineluctable manner” in which the music is indifferent to
the scenes (Chion, 2019, p.8).
In addition to the added value of sound to the image, the sound can enrich the image by
giving it a definitive impression in the immediate experience one has from it (Chion, 2019) in a
way that text or writing alone fails to enrich the image. This forges a relationship between
“something one sees and something one hears.” (Chion, 2019, p.5) Due to the significance of the
forged relationship between the sound and the image, generally, the audience can process sonic
and visual information faster and with less resistance than textual information (Winkler &
Pieslak, 2018). Information transmitted audiovisually is more memorable and enjoyable than
information shared through text because the sound is a critical element that is designed to draw
the attention of the viewer to the visual content. Therefore, sound elements in jihadi videos
enhance the visual content by making it more memorable and easier to process and recall.
More importantly, jihadi organizations emphasize heavily on using a specific form of sound,
i.e., anashid, in their media campaigns. In 44 Ways to Support Jihad, a 2009 essay written by
Anwar al-Awlaki, the jihadi leader encouraged his supporters to use anashid because of
anashid’s ability to reach a wider and younger audience, and he identified anashid as a necessary
component in creating a “jihadi culture” (Lahoud, 2017, p.42). Another jihadi leader, Osama bin
Laden, recognized the importance of anashid early on in the 1970s by establishing anashid group
and distributing the tapes to his friends (Said, 2012). Hence, the combination of sound and image
is not the only factor why anashid are an important sonic element in jihadi media products. Jihadi
leaders place their emphasis on the usefulness of anashid to attract the listener and produce an
“activist jihadi culture.” (Lahoud, 2017, p.43)
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When exploring some of the different sonic components in jihadi media products, one finds
that jihadi music, anashid, is often used in video production. Anashid are defined as a sung a
capella (Lahoud, 2017) that are vocalized by one or several male voices (Gråtrud, 2016). Some
associate the origin of jihadi anashid to the late 1960s during the Arab-Israeli War in which
Fatah–a Palestinian political party–disseminated anashid with violence-endorsing themes
(Pieslak, 2017). Others link the origin of jihadi anashid to the 1970s and 1980s because they are
connected to Islamic revival in Western Asia and North Africa (WANA) region (Ramsay, 2013).
During this period, jihadi organizations started producing videos, and, by the 2000s, the number
of videos had increased exponentially due to technological advancement (Stenersen, 2017). At
the same time, the strict views of Salafism2 had begun to influence the content of jihadi anashid,
and this contributed to a stricter interpretation of music utilization, including influencing content,
lack of instruments, and male-only munshid.
The stricter interpretation of music utilization contributed to the current structure of jihadi
anashid, in which such structure is identical to jihadi poetry because anashid are composed in
classical Arabic by applying the rules of Arabic poetry (Gråtrud, 2016). So, principally, they are
indistinguishable from jihadi poetry (Ramsay, 2013). Since the use of musical instruments in
jihadi anashid is forbidden, jihadi organizations manipulate and multilayer the voices in anashid
to introduce a relatively modern effect to voices that substitute the use of instruments (Ramsay,
2013; Stenersen, 2017). Hence, sound effects paint anashid with contemporary quality. Also, the

Salafism, from al-salaf al-salih, or the pious predecessors, is a term used to describe pious Muslims who represent
the best of Islam because they follow Prophet Muhammad and his predecessors as closely as possible. However,
Salafis are not a homogenous group because they are different categories of Salafis, including those who focus on
education and missionary activities, politics, or jihad, who are considered minority among the Salafis (Wagemakers,
2018).
2
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structure of anashid–composed in classical Arabic, applying a single meter, and two hemistichs–
help emphasize repetition and rapid sequence of sound (Gråtrud, 2016).
The munshid (singer) has to possess specific skills that stimulate the emotions of listeners
and master “rhetorical flourishes… and linguistic tools to facilitate memorization,” such skills
include analogy, repetition, a contrast in meanings, and especially rhymed prose in which the
combination produces a musical output, even though the nashid is not accompanied by musical
instruments (Lahoud, 2017, p.44). The influence of repetition on story understanding and
auditory recall is highlighted in Drew and Grimes’ study in which they found when there is a
high-redundancy condition, there is a higher story understanding and auditory recall (Drew &
Grimes, 1987). For example, Gråtrud (2016) explains how, in the ISIS nasheed Clanging of the
Swords, the chorus3 is repeated at least sixteen out of twenty-five times, and even when there is
no chorus–that when some lines are repeated multiple times–it is through this repetition that key
ideas become emphasized and emotions become engaged.
Others who study jihadi anashid argue that there is a cultural value to the utilization of
anashid in jihadi media campaigns (Hegghammer, 2017; Lahoud, 2017; Pieslak, 2017; Ramsay,
2013). Such cultural significance can be identified as “products and practices that do something
other than fill the basic military needs of jihadi groups.” (Hegghammer, 2017, p.5). Ramsay
highlights the notion of cultural capital, such as but not limited to, the right taste in music, in
which, the investment in cultural capital can ensure social membership and subculture groupings,
like fan communities (Ramsay, 2013). Although the origin of anashid is contested, some jihadi
organizations pursue anashid production as means to “enticing recruits, retaining members, and
motivating members to action by eliciting emotion,” (Pieslak, 2017, p.63) Specifically, Lemieux

3

Part of a song that is repeated several times by more than one singer (Dictionary.com, n.d.).
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and Nill (2011) state that music can create a platform that enables shared interests, concerns,
likes and dislikes, and ideas of members to be underlined and raised. Moreover, it is essential to
note that music with violent lyrics can potentially increase the amount of aggressive thoughts and
feelings. Still, it may not be directly linked to behaviors in all instances (Lemieux & Nill, 2011).
Despite different interpretations of anashid origin and studies examining the themes utilized
in jihad anashid (Gråtrud, 2016; Lahoud, 2017; Lahoud & Pieslak, 2018; Pieslak, 2015; Pieslak
& Lahoud, 2018; Weinreich & Pelevin, 2012), it is essential to look at the audiovisual messaging
strategies in jihadi videos as to analyze the connection between sonic elements and content. To
this end, this study examines the audiovisual communication strategies in the Taliban, ISIS, and
AQAP videos. To examine the interaction of sonic and visual strategies, this study utilizes a
multimodal approach, specifically reinforcement and redundancy of the sonic elements. In their
study, Winkler and Pieslak state that multimodal components–reinforcement and redundancy–
serve to implore framing cues and broader narratives, which is made possible through activating
“pre-existing attitudes that increase message salience” (Winkler & Pieslak, 2018, p.346). The
ability to repeat segments–redundancy–heightens the viewer’s recall speed and accuracy,
comprehension, and learning. Specifically, Winkler and Pieslak’s study examines the
reinforcement aspect of sonic elements that are used to appeal to the visual and auditory senses
since viewers process sonic and visual information faster than textual information. Therefore,
this thesis focuses on examining audiovisual communication strategies rather than other
information-sharing channels, and that is not to say other information-sharing channels are not
worthy of scholarly attention. Rather, the utilization of music and other sonic techniques in jihadi
videos has deep meaning in jihadi culture and the ability of music to entice recruits and elicit
emotions.
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3

METHODOLOGY

In this study, there is a total of 118 videos analyzed: ninety-five videos produced by the Taliban
between 2011 and 2018, with an average length of 17 minutes (median of 9.5 minutes); thirteen
videos produced by ISIS between 2015 and 2016, with an average length of 13 minutes (median
of 10.5 minutes); and ten videos produced by AQAP between 2010 and 2018, with an average
length of 24 minutes (median of 25.4 minutes). For a complete list of videos’ title, date, duration,
and length, refer to Appendix A, B, and C. The number of videos listed are by no means
representative of the total number of videos produced by the groups. It is important to note that
since the collection process of the Taliban videos started in 2018, the majority of videos in the
sample are from 2018, and the Taliban videos from earlier years were added to the sample to
consider the change in communication strategies utilized by the group over time.
Furthermore, in an effort to examine the audiovisual messaging strategies, ISIS and AQAP
videos were selected based on the dynamic of the audiovisual content in the videos. That is,
videos showing still images, or a screenshot were not considered during the collection process.
The reason for excluding still images and screenshots is because they lack dynamic visual
content and sonic elements, i.e., lack of anashid utilization and background sounds. Furthermore,
this research excludes anashid videos–those that are comparable to music videos–because, in
some of these videos, different Sonic Modes are not utilized to their fullest extent, and such
videos often utilize foregrounded anashid as the sole Sonic Mode. The selection of both ISIS and
AQAP videos, based on their audiovisual messaging strategies, was done randomly; ISIS videos
were selected from a sample of over 600 videos and AQAP from a sample of over 450 videos.
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Currently, the Mobilizing Media4 team collected 478 videos produced by the Taliban, 913
ISIS videos, and 143 AQAP videos. Two things are important to note regarding the data
collection process. One, the numbers mentioned above are by no means representative of all
videos produced by the three groups because some videos are circulating through online
platforms that have not been captured nor included in the sample of videos. Second, the analysis
of videos was conducted over sixteen months, starting with video analysis of the Taliban,
followed by ISIS then al-Qa’ida. Therefore, as the analysis was being conducted, the groups
were producing newer videos that are not considered when selecting the sample.
3.1

Data Analysis

All 118 videos are analyzed through NVivo Software by manually coding videos. As will be
discussed below, the use of an extensive and detailed codebook allowed for capturing the
maximum amount of details in videos produced by the Taliban. Table 3.1.1 shows a detailed
view of how the variables are defined and measured in the study. The common themes or visual
content observed in videos are Military Training, Martyrdom, Conquest and Military Operation,
Oppression and Suffering, Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, Punishment and Execution, and Power
Projection. A detailed description of the themes is discussed in the Results section. Furthermore,
Sonic Modes observed in the study are anashid playing in the foreground, anashid playing in the
background, battleground sounds, non-battleground sounds, live singing, and vocalization.
The codebook utilized in this study is supported by themes and sonic elements observed in
other studies. The Martyrdom theme utilized in this study is also observed in (Aggarwal, 2016;

4 Mobilizing Media: A Deep and Comparative Analysis of Magazines, Music, and Videos in the Context of
Terrorism is a project that seeks to examine diverse components of successful online propaganda by extremist
groups. The project is funded by the Minerva Research Initiative through the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research.
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Hafez, 2007; Mahood & Rane, 2017; Stenersen, 2017; Winkler & Pieslak, 2018). In these
studies, the dominant narrative of martyrdom rewards is often highlighted in jihadi videos
(Winkler & Pieslak, 2018) by showing long clips of martyrdom (Hafez, 2007). Therefore, one
would expect there is a high emphasis on the Martyrdom theme in jihadi videos; but, how do
these groups compare in coverage percentage of the Martyrdom theme? The second theme
observed is the Military Training theme that is underlined in Winkler and Pieslak’s study. They
observe the utilization of specific core themes in Military Training segments in ISIS videos, such
themes include all recruits successfully complete the training, recruits who complete the training
are superior and become unified members of ISIS fighter group, and ISIS military will attain its
military campaign goals. Therefore, another prominent theme this study looks for is Military
Training. The Conquest and Military Operation theme observed in this study is also identified by
(Stenersen, 2017; Winkler et al., 2020), in which Winkler et al. state that the competitive nature
of non-state groups is contributed to the use of military operation against state actors. So, one
would expect to find Conquest and Military Operation theme in jihadi videos since such content
indicates the competitiveness and legitimacy of the group.

Table 3.1.1 Measurement of Codes in the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP Videos

Common Themes

Code

Description

Military Training

Showing Group of fighters in training camps
who are practicing physical exercises and
firearm training. Physical training includes
stretching, jogging, sit-ups, rope-climbing, etc.
Firearm training includes practicing aiming
skills by firing shots from handguns, rifles,
heavy machine guns, throwing grenades,
firing missiles and Rocket-Propelled Grenade
(RPG), etc.
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Martyrdom

Sonic Modes

Showing martyrs’ clips or images, such as
recorded messages of pre- and/or postmartyrdom operations. Martyrdom clips also
include dead bodies of martyrs who perished
in combat and narrator showing and talking
about dead martyrs.

Conquest and Military Operation

Fighters are shown raiding a city/military
compound and liberating the territory from
state and international troops. This theme is
different from Amaliyat Inghimasiyah because
the fighters are much greater in numbers and
are not carrying a suicide mission (even if they
will not survive the military operation), and
there are no pre-recorded messages of
mujahidin before conducting the operation.

Oppression and Suffering

Showing clips of civilian casualty or
oppression of citizens at the hands of local
government, international alliances (NATO,
Security Belt Forces, etc.), the United States,
and other terrorist organizations. Such images
of oppression often include bodies of injured
or dead children due to airstrikes.

Amaliyat Inghimasiyah

Showing martyrs heavily armed and going
into a lethal martyrdom operation in an
attempt to weaken the enemy and inflict as
many causalities as possible. This theme
includes footage when martyrs are conducting
the martyrdom operation.

Punishment and Execution

Showing clips of how the jihadi group is
establishing "justice" by punishing those who
defy their rule, committed crimes, or captured
military personnel and police officers. Clips
shown in videos include executions,
beheadings, and dead bodies of military
personnel after a battle.

Power Projection

Terrorist groups show their military
capabilities, including showing clips of a
significant number of fighters. Also, clips of
spoils of war, such as firearms, heavy machine
guns, ammunition, tanks and High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, etc.

Anashid in the Foreground

Nasheed is playing in the foreground either
dominating the sound element or with other
sounds, such as speech or battle sounds.
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Anashid in the Background

Nasheed is playing in the background
dominated by other sounds.

Battle Sounds

Sounds of gunshots, explosions, flame, jets or
helicopter flying overhead, etc.

Non-Battle Sounds

Sounds of people shouting, thunder, animals
(horse’s neigh, lion’s roar), burning sound of
paper, etc.

Live Singing

Live singing of anashid

Vocalization

Humming sound

Moreover, Hafez (2007) finds that humiliation experienced at the hands of “arrogant
powers” in which such clips are accompanied by “chilling melancholic chants” and images of
children and women killed with bombardment (Hafez, 2007, p.99). Hence, to justify martyrdom
committed by the groups against state actors and other groups, one would find Oppression and
Suffering of civilians at the hands of “arrogant powers” to be reinforced with Sonic Modes, such
as vocalization. Another theme that often captures scholarly attention is the Punishment and
Execution theme. Such a theme is detected by (Euben, 2017; Friis, 2015; Mahood & Rane, 2017;
Stenersen, 2017) and includes executions of those who committed a “crime,” such as captured
military personnel, police officers, tribe leaders, and civilians within the controlled territory by
the group. Therefore, it is important to explore the audiovisual content that falls under the
Punishment and Execution theme since such theme is often examined in ISIS video studies.
In addition to themes observed by other studies, this study looks at additional themes used in
video production by the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP. Such themes include Amaliyat Inghimasiyah
and Power Projection. Specifically, this study distinguishes between Martyrdom and Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah segments. For a detailed description of the difference, refer to Table 3.1.1. The
reason for distinguishing between the two themes, even though they might fall under a similar
category, is to explore whether there is a difference in the utilization of sonic elements when the
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groups are talking about martyrdom and when show clips of martyrdom operations. Also, adding
Power Projection theme is essential to the analysis because these groups often show off their
military capabilities and spoils-of-war in the videos.
Furthermore, sonic elements included in the codebook are also observed in other studies.
This study focuses on examining how and where live singing is utilized in the videos produced
by the three groups. In (Pieslak et al., 2019), the authors examine the utilization of “live
recitation” in a collection of 755 ISIS videos. Also, in (Stenersen, 2017; Winkler & Pieslak,
2018), the authors notice the utilization of different anashid techniques (foregrounded or
backgrounded) when examining the audiovisual messaging strategies in jihadi videos. Therefore,
closely examining the changes in anashid techniques (foreground vs. background vs. live
singing), non-battleground and battleground sounds, and vocalization produces a better
assessment of how jihadi groups use diverse Sonic Modes in their video products.
The analysis process of each group’s videos was conducted in two stages. The first stage
includes assigning codes to the videos using all codes provided, and the second stage includes
increasing the accuracy of the coded segments by assigning specific codes to the four coders.
The Taliban videos were coded first, followed by ISIS, then AQAP. During the first stage of the
Taliban and ISIS video analysis, coders employed a comprehensive list of codes. Then, the
second stage of data analysis entailed code-specialization in one set of codes and were asked to
confirm the accuracy of the coded segments, add new segments to specific codes, dispute it, or
point out confusion to be considered separately and clarified.
During the initial coding process, four coders utilized a comprehensive codebook that
contains detailed codes to analyze the Taliban videos. For instance, under the Oppression and
Suffering theme, they were instructed to code segments that fall under “destroyed
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buildings/infrastructure, civilian victims, victims as women, victims as children, etc.” The
detailed codes guided the coders towards a more accurate placement of segments in their proper
category. Also, by focusing their attention on specific codes, coders are better able to notice the
emergence of new observations that might fall under a particular theme. For example, if one
coder noticed the emergence of “censored civilian victims” that would fall under the Oppression
and Suffering theme, then, during the weekly meeting, coders discussed the emergence and
prominence of new observations. This process allowed coders to capture new observations and
increase the accuracy of the coded theme.
Moreover, throughout the coding process, coders met weekly to discuss and resolve
discrepancies when utilizing the codes. For example, when one coder observed the use of people
shouting sounds in the foreground and other coders did not directly notice a similar observation,
they met to clarify the coding and how to categorize it. Therefore, weekly meetings discussing
the codebook and new observations contributed to strengthening inter-coder reliability.
After completing the first stage of coding the Taliban videos, coders moved to analyze ISIS
videos by utilizing the same comprehensive codebook. After finishing coding all ISIS videos,
coders were assigned specific codes and were instructed to check the accuracy of the coded
segments that were observed during the first stage. For example, Sonic Modes were assigned to
one coder, and the coder re-watched all of the Taliban and ISIS videos to check the correctness
of the coded segments. Consequently, increasing the accuracy of the coded segments as well as
inter-coder reliability.
After checking the accuracy of their specialized coded segments in the Taliban and ISIS
videos, two coders started analyzing 10 AQAP videos by utilizing a more general codebook. It is
important to mention that, unlike the first stage analysis of the Taliban and ISIS videos, AQAP
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first stage included utilizing a broad codebook and coding for general thematic content, such as
coding for Oppression and Suffering theme and not detailed codes. As coders became more
specialized and familiar with the analysis process, utilizing a broad codebook allowed us to
preserve time and focus on specific codes. As for the second stage of coding, one coder rewatched AQAP videos and specialized in adding Sonic Modes to the analysis.
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4

RESULTS

After careful analysis of videos produced by the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP, this study finds two
outcomes; one, there are seven common themes in videos produced by the three groups; and two,
there are discrepancies within the sonic elements utilized in the common themes. The seven
common themes observed in the videos are Military Training, Martyrdom, Conquest and
Military Operation, Oppression and Suffering, Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, Punishment and
Execution, and Power Projection. Moreover, Sonic Modes utilized in this study are anashid in
the background, anashid in the foreground, vocalization, live singing, non-battle sounds, and
battle sounds. The sections below further explain the two outcomes.
4.1

Common Themes

After examining the observed themes in other studies (Euben, 2017; Friis, 2015; Hafez, 2007;
Mahood & Rane, 2017; Stenersen, 2017; Winkler et al., 2019; Winkler & Pieslak, 2018) and
watching the 118 videos produced by the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP, one primary result is the
emergence of shared thematic content in videos produced by the three groups, such as Military
Training, Martyrdom, Conquest and Military Operation, Oppression and Suffering, Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah, Punishment and Execution, and Power Projection.
4.1.1

Military Training

In Military Training segments, the three organizations show a group of men in boot camps,
training to improve their physical endurance, and arm-to-arm combat and firearm skills. For
example, in the Taliban’s video, Convoy of Conquest #12, there are five references of Military
Training segments covering 62.27% of the entire duration of the video. The video begins by
showing a large number of men marching while carrying firearms as well as RPGs. Then,
divided segments show eleven men aiming at bullseye targets to increase their aiming skills and
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weapon-handling. Later on, the same men are shown during physical and weaponry training in
which the segments are divided between an individual martyr training followed by an
introductory message from the same martyr. After introducing the martyrs, the camera switches
to show the men exercising, such as doing warm-up activities and stretching, sprinting, corebuilding activities, and jumping through fire hoops and over burning tires. After physical
training, individuals are practicing their firearm and aiming skills, such as shooting firearm while
moving towards a target, lying down on the ground, and moving, then dropping down on the
ground. Also, the video shows these men practicing taking down each other, handcuffing, and
frisking. At the end of the video, there are short training segments shown of the martyrs after
committing a martyrdom operation.
4.1.2

Martyrdom

In Martyrdom segments, the jihadi groups are playing still or moving images of martyrs who
died by an airstrike, during a military operation, or as a result of a martyrdom operation. Some of
the content that falls under Martyrdom segments includes recorded messages of pre- and postmartyrdom operations, bodies of martyrs who died in combat, narrator talking about perished
martyrs, or showing pictures of martyrs who died. For example, in a video produced by ISIS, My
son has preceded me, the narrator is describing how the younger generation is now used to an
environment riddled by war and struggle, and how they are making all the sacrifices. At the
beginning of the video, the narrator is reading a short script between a father and a son, in which
the father is encouraging his son to commit martyrdom so he can join all other martyrs in heaven.
Then, clips of the young martyr with his father are showing the father’s reasons for encouraging
his son to walk the martyrdom path. In a later clip, an ISIS interview team is conducting Q&A
with the young 14-year-old martyr and his father. By solely examining clips of martyrs before
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committing amaliyah inghimasiyah, one can distinguish between the utilization of Sonic Modes
before, during, and after a martyrdom operation. This is explained in further detail is in section
4.1.5 Amaliyat Inghimasiyah.
4.1.3

Conquest and Military Operation

In Conquest and Military Operation segments, the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP utilize footage of
when they are raiding military compounds or cities under the state’s control. The men in the
videos are using weapons, such as firearms, grenades, RPGs, and armored vehicles. Conquest
and Military Operation content is different from the content that falls under Martyrdom or
Amaliyat Inghimasiyah for two main reasons. One, the jihadi groups raid and attack military
compounds and personnel in larger numbers than those who commit martyrdom operations.
Second, the primary purpose of Conquest and Military Operation content is “liberating” a city,
territory, or site from the enemy’s control. On the other side, martyrdom operations are aimed at
inflicting maximum damage to the enemy through suicidal operations. For instance, in The
Conquest of Ghazni, a video produced by the Taliban, the group shows the aftermath of a
military operation in Ghazni, Afghanistan. The video starts by showing the aftermath of the
group’s operation to “liberate” Ghazni. Afterward, there are interview clips with the mujahidin
who participated in the military operation. In this video, the Conquest and Military Operation
theme covers 96.56% of the total duration. In another example, a video produced by ISIS, Raid
of Suhayb al Iraqi, falls under the theme in which there is one reference covering 100% of the
video. The video shows a man giving a speech to the fighters before going to battle to motivate
them as they prepare their weapons for battle. After that, the video shows actual footage of the
battle that lasted for several hours, and at the end of the video, the screen is displaying clips of
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the aftermath of the battle and the camera focused on the killed martyrs to show the significance
of the sacrifice.
4.1.4

Oppression and Suffering

In the Oppression and Suffering theme, the groups use content that describes the suffering and
oppression experienced by unarmed civilians. Such content includes footage of the damage
caused by airstrikes to human life and infrastructure. The groups often highlight civilian
casualties by showing dead bodies of children, and the destruction of homes and businesses
caused by airstrikes. Also, the groups illustrate how local forces and international alliances are
treating civilians by showing footage of mistreatment experienced at the hands of government
officials. An example of the theme can be seen in the Repulsion of Aggression 1 by AQAP.
Oppression and Suffering theme covers 95.82% of the total duration of the video, with four
references to the theme. The video starts with Quranic recitation (Surah al-Nisa’) in which the
group emphasizes the part of the Surah that questions those who are not fighting for the
oppressed. Then, the video shows an interview with a crying woman who says that the
government is keeping her innocent sons incarcerated. After the interview, the video plays
excerpts of media reporters who are discussing how the Yemeni government and the United
States are indiscriminately killing civilians, and indefinitely imprisoning innocent Muslims.
Later on, the video shifts to showing interviews with civilians who experienced persecution at
the hands of the government, the Security Belt Forces, and the United States. It is important to
note that videos containing Oppression and Suffering theme will often include Martyrdom and
Amaliyat Inghimasiyah themes because the group justifies martyrdom by showing persecution of
civilians at the hands of the local government and international alliances.
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4.1.5

Amaliyat Inghimasiyah

In Amaliyat Inghimasiyah segments, a martyr(s) is shown heavily armed, wearing a suicide vest,
or riding a bombed vehicle as he goes into a suicide mission. Even though this theme implies that
the martyr is going to die, this theme is different from Martyrdom segments because it contains
segments when the martyr is conducting a martyrdom operation, and he is a few seconds away
from dying. It is important to make the previously mentioned distinction to be able to capture
how Sonic Modes differ when talking about martyrdom and then showing the actual martyrdom
operation. An example is My son has preceded me produced by ISIS, where Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah covers 23.68% of the total duration of the video. In the segment, after ISIS media
crew conducts interviews with the martyr and his father, the group shows the father helping his
son climb into the bombed vehicle and giving him final instructions on how to proceed. Later on,
the video shows footage of the vehicle approaching a police checkpoint and then exploding upon
reaching the target.
4.1.6

Punishment and Execution

In Punishment and Execution segments, the three groups show how they are establishing justice
and punishing those who defy their laws, commit crimes, or captured police officers and military
personnel. Some of the clips that fall under the theme include executions, beheadings, and dead
bodies of police officers or military personnel. For example, in America and Its Latest Trap 2, an
AQAP video, there are two references to the theme in the video covering 11.49% of the total
duration. In the first reference, the group shows recorded segments of American soldiers
dropping down from a helicopter with a stretcher. Then, in the same reference, an interview with
the mujahidin shows that they were fighting American soldiers and inflicted a lot of damage to
them. In the second reference, the group shows various segments of what the group attained as
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they fight the United States. In these segments, they show various images with a country’s name
followed by “Cemetery.” For instance, they write “Yemen Cemetery” and accompany it with
pictures of fallen U.S. soldiers, USS Cole after the attack, and coffins wrapped with the U.S.
flag. In another example, ISIS produced video, The good men, there is one reference to the theme
in which it covers 19.45% of the total duration of the video. In the video, the group is filming the
execution of a prisoner.
4.1.7

Power Projection

In Power Projection videos, the groups show their military capabilities by displaying a great
number of fighters lining up and spoils-of-war, such as ammunition, firearms, heavy machine
guns, tanks, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle. An example of the theme is observed
in the Taliban video, Conquests in Qarabagh (Ghazni). The theme covers 47.36% of the total
duration, with a total of 4 references to the theme. In the video, there is an interview with a man
who is surrounded by firearms and ammunition and explaining how the conquest happened. In
the following clip, there is a man in a room talking and surrounded with around ten assault rifles.
Then, another clip shows a close shot to the weapons in possession of the group, such as assault
rifles, machine guns, and RPGs displayed on the ground in a room. In another example, Victory
from God and an imminent conquest, and ISIS videos, there are a total of 3 references, covering
31.50% of the total duration of the video. In the first reference, the camera shows a large number
of men lined up, carrying their weapons, and ready to go into battle. Also, right before the battle,
the scene is showing the soldiers riding their tanks and trucks and driving towards the targets.
4.2

Analysis of the Common Themes Observed in the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP

In Table 4.2.1, Conquest and Military Operation theme in the Taliban videos is the highest used
theme, capturing 25.10% of the total duration of the coded segments. Followed by Military
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Training segments in which 24.54% of the coded parts fall under the theme. So, approximately
50% of the coded segments in the Taliban videos are under Conquest and Military Operation and
Military Training. Almost half of the coded segments fall under two themes, indicating that there
is a strong emphasis on showing the group’s capability to re-capture territory and their physical
and combative skill. On the other hand, the lowest percentage of the total duration is under
Punishment and Execution theme, capturing 0.79% of the coded segments, indicating that the
group emphasizes less on establishing a “just” community and punishing captured government
men. The remaining percentage of duration is somewhat evenly distributed between Martyrdom,
Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, Oppression and Suffering, and Power Projection themes.
Table 4.2.1 The Taliban’s Number of Videos and References, Duration, and Range of
Theme Coverage

The
Taliban

Theme

Number of
Videos5

Number of
References6

Approximate
Total
Duration (in
minutes)

Percentage
of Duration
(in
minutes)7

Military Training

16

52

347

24.54%

Martyrdom

7

21

172

12.17%

Conquest and
Military Operation

40

40

355

25.10%

0.02% 98.9%

Oppression and
Suffering

25

32

214

15.18%

0.5% 99.1%

Range of
Theme
Coverage8
0.5% 95.7%
12% 53.5%

The total number of videos coded under each theme is not similar to the total number of videos analyzed for each
group due to the existence of more than one theme in a given video. Hence, the total number of videos coded for the
Taliban is 95, and the 113 reflect the existence of duplicate videos due to the group’s utilization of more than one
theme in one video.
6 Number of References refers to how many times the code has been utilized continuously in videos in which one
video can have as many references as possible. For example, if Martyrdom theme exists in one video twice in which
it is coded from 01:13 until 02:50 and again from 05:04 until 10:32, then the number of references in that specific
video is going to be 2 for Martyrdom theme.
7 This is calculated by dividing each theme’s Approximate Total Duration by the total in Approximate Total
Duration (1413 minutes).
8 This indicates the range of theme coverage (percent) in a given theme. This is calculated through NVivo, in which
the software produces a list of all videos containing a specific theme and the percentage of coded segments in each
video.
5
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Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah

8

12

157

11.08%

11.9% 73.7%

Punishment and
Execution

2

2

11

0.79%

6.5% - 9.9%

Power Projection

33

72

157

11.13%

0.2% 90.3%

Total

131

231

1413

100.00%

-

Conquest and Military Operation videos have the broadest range, between 0.02% and
98.9%, of theme coverage out of all observed themes. Indicating that in a given video, 0.02% of
the content falls under the Conquest and Military Operation theme, and the remaining content
falls under a different theme. On the other hand, 98.9% of the content in a specific video falls
under Conquest and Military Operation theme, and the remaining percentage (1.1%) of the
video’s duration falls under different theme(s). The high percentage of coverage indicates that
the group produces videos aimed specifically at showing the group’s ability to conquer their
enemy by re-capturing a place or territory and defeating the local military. As for the low
percentage of coverage, it shows that the group cares about covering Conquest and Military
Operation briefly, even though the general theme of a specific video is not Conquest and Military
Operation.
On the other hand, in Table 4.2.2, in ISIS videos, the highest percentage of duration is
Military Training, taking 29.25% of the coded segments’ total duration. 30% of the total
percentage of theme duration covers the group’s physical and weaponry skills. This is followed
by Martyrdom and Conquest and Military Operation with 25.32% and 20.65%, respectively.
However, compared to ISIS, the Taliban places a larger emphasis on using content that portrays
the capability of the group to gain territorial dominance. Yet, both groups allocated close to one-
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quarter of video content to Military Training and Conquest and Military Operation
themes.
Table 4.2.2 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’s Number of Videos and References,
Duration, and Range of Theme Coverage

ISIS

Theme

Number of
Videos

Number of
References

Approximate
Total
Duration (in
minutes)

Percentage
of Duration
(in minutes)

Range of
Theme
Coverage

Military Training

5

6

39

29.25%

17.3% 96.9%

Martyrdom

5

9

34

25.32%

1.1% 76.3%

Conquest and
Military Operation

3

4

28

20.65%

2.1% - 100%

Oppression and
Suffering

1

1

0.27

0.20%

1.20%

Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah

6

6

22

16.39%

14.3% 97.6%

Punishment and
Executions

1

1

2

1.31%

19.50%

Power Projection

2

5

9

6.89%

24.4% 31.5%

Total

23

32

133

100.00%

-

In ISIS videos, some of the lowest percentages of coverage are in Oppression and Suffering
(0.20%), Punishment and Execution (1.31%), and Power Projection (6.89%), indicating that the
group focuses on increasing coverage of other themes, such as Military Training, Martyrdom,
and Conquest and Military Operation. This is expected since the group focuses on showing the
successful completion and superiority of members who go through ISIS military training
(Winkler & Pieslak, 2018), the rewards of martyrdom (Hafez, 2007; Winkler & Pieslak, 2018),
and the competitiveness and triumph of the group when conducting a military operation (Winkler
et al., 2020). Comparing the Taliban and ISIS, both allocate around 1% of the duration to show
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the ability of the group to establish a “just community” by punishing citizens who don’t follow
the law and captured military personnel and police officers (Punishment and Execution). It is
important to point out that one of the possible explanations for the low percentage of Punishment
and Execution theme duration in ISIS videos is because this study excludes anashid videos. In
Pieslak and Lahoud’s study (2018), Tarhib theme, i.e., causing people to be terrified or fearful, is
in the center of focus in ISIS anashid in which it appeared in 31 out of 122 ISIS nashid. They
argue that Tarhib is highlighted in ISIS anashid to remind “of gruesome actions that await the
enemies of IS, but is also educated into the rationale of the gory actions of IS as a method and a
philosophy to embrace and celebrate.” (Pieslak & Lahoud, 2018, p.287). Therefore, excluding
anashid videos, where ISIS uses execution segments to reinforce the Tarhib theme, may have
caused the low duration percentage in this research. Consequently, one can assume that ISIS
focuses less on content that falls under Punishment and Execution theme in their non-anashid
videos. However, based on the results in this study, a definite conclusion cannot be made without
examining multimodal messaging strategies in ISIS anashid videos.
In Table 4.2.3, as predicted by Stenersen (2017), Oppression and Suffering theme in AQAP
videos is the most used theme in the video sample where it covers 28.11% of the coded
segments. This implies that the group emphasizes more on showing civilian casualty and
oppression experienced by state actors. The second highest observed theme (22.99%) is
Martyrdom. As for Amaliyat Inghimasiyah and Conquest and Military Operation, they cover
13.66% and 12.90%, respectively. Unlike the Taliban and ISIS, who emphasize more on
showing off their military capabilities and physical and weaponry skills, AQAP focuses more the
oppression experienced at the hands of the local government and state actors.
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Table 4.2.3 AQAP’s Number of Videos and References, Duration, and Range of Theme
Coverage

AQAP

Theme

Numbe
r of
Videos

Number
of
Reference
s

Approximat
e Total
Duration (in
minutes)

Percentag
e of
Duration
(in
minutes)

Range of
Theme
Coverage

Military Training

6

12

14

4.86%

1.7% - 22%

Martyrdom

5

18

50

22.99%

7.7% 96.6%

Conquest and Military
Operation

3

3

28

12.90%

3.3% 68.1%

Oppression and Suffering

9

20

80

28.11%

0.3% 95.9%

Amaliyat Inghimasiyah

6

13

39

13.66%

8.2% 43.8%

Punishment and
Executions

3

5

4

1.39%

2.8% 11.5%

Power Projection

5

7

4

1.32%

1.2% - 5.6%

Total

42

82

284

100.00%

-

Military Training (4.86%), Punishment and Executions (1.39%), and Power Projection
(1.32%) are also used the least in the AQAP video sample, indicating the group’s low emphasis
on the previously mentioned themes. When comparing the three groups, Punishment and
Execution theme has a similar low coverage percentage, indicating that the group does not
prioritize covering the content of those who commit crimes, defy their authority, or captured
military and state individuals. As mentioned previously, one of the possible explanations for
getting a low duration percentage of Punishment and Execution theme in ISIS videos is due to
excluding anashid videos from the sample studied. However, low coverage of Punishment and
Execution theme in AQAP videos is expected because Sheikh Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, al-Qa’ida
veteran who had ties to Osama bin Laden, states that ISIS beheadings and execution videos are
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barbaric and not acceptable (Simcox, 2015). Therefore, it is expected to notice low Punishment
and Execution theme in AQAP videos since the group often criticizes ISIS for their graphic
video production. Even though executions and beheadings continue to be the Taliban’s frequent
method of severe discipline, the Taliban leaders have “made an appeal to end this unpopular
battlefield conduct.” (Johnson & DuPee, 2012, p.81) So, one would expect that the Taliban
emphasizes less on covering Punishment and Execution content.
In AQAP videos, Oppression and Suffering videos contain the widest range of theme
coverage out of all observed themes, between 0.3% and 95.9%, indicating that in a particular
video, 0.3% of the duration is covering the content of Oppression and Suffering, but 99.7% is
covering another theme(s). On the other hand, the highest coverage percentage is 98.9%,
showing that AQAP places particular emphasis on covering Oppression and Suffering content in
one specific video.
4.3

Sonic Modes

After observing the Common Themes in the videos, one wonders how each group compare and
contrast in their utilization of different Sonic Modes in the common themes. Such sonic modes
include anashid in the background, anashid in the foreground, battle sounds, non-battle sounds,
live singing, and vocalization. This section discusses how each group uses different Sonic Modes
in common themes, as well as the similarities and differences when they are employing different
Sonic Modes in common themes.
4.3.1

Use of Sonic Modes by the Taliban

Table 4.3.1.1 offers an analysis of the Taliban videos with an observed number of duration (in
minutes) of each Sonic Mode in common themes with expected values in parenthesis. As seen in
the table, anashid are used differently in each theme. When looking at the utilization of anashid
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in the background, there is a higher chance of finding anashid in the background in Conquest and
Military Operation segments than in other themes. In these segments, the group is displaying
clips of mujahidin raiding military compounds and cities under the state’s control. For
instance, in Enemy Defeat in Kunduz, there is a great number of mujahidin holding their weapons
and are seen walking around in a military compound after they have killed all of the soldiers and
“liberated” the area. The utilization of backgrounded anashid indicates that the group is placing
high emphasis on the content or the message that is being broadcasted to the audience than
playing music in the foreground but still believes in the significance of anashid to scene by
placing them in the background.
Table 4.3.1 Crosstab of The Taliban’s Utilization of Sonic Modes Across Common
Themes

Military
Training
Martyrdom
Conquest and
Military
Operation
Oppression
and Suffering
Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah
Punishment
and
Execution
Power
Projection

Anashid in
the
Background
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Vocalization
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Non-Battle
Sounds
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Sounds

24.8
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17.5

3.1

28.2

125.2

(44.89)

(121.34)

(26.33)

(2.01)

(24.78)

(90.07)

11.7

80.2

4.1

1.8

6.3

26.4

(21.30)

(57.58)

(12.50)

(0.95)

(11.76)

(42.74)

67.2

64.2

0.5

0.6

9.5

21.7

(29.06)

(78.56)

(17.05)

(1.30)

(16.04)

(58.32)

11.5

26.4

53.3

0.2

19.9

25.1

(22.76)

(61.53)

(13.35)

(1.02)

(12.57)

(45.68)

8.3

27.9

4.6

0

0

47.6

(11.69)

(31.61)

(6.86)

(0.52)

(6.45)

(23.46)

0

0

6.2

0

6.2

11.1

(2.54)

(6.86)

(1.49)

(0.11)

(1.4)

(5.09)

23.4

52.6

0

0.9

11.0

37.7

(17.99)

(48.62)

(10.55)

(0.80)

(9.93)

(36.09)

χ2 = 408.81

p-value < 0.001

*Expected values are in parenthesis
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Also, looking at Figure 4.3.1-1, the observed value of backgrounded anashid in Conquest
and Military Operation segments is higher than expected (67.2 minutes observed vs. 29.06
minutes expected). This indicates that videos containing Conquest and Military Operation
segments are most likely to contain anashid in the background as a preferred Sonic Mode than
other sonic techniques. Throughout the Conquest and Military Operation segments, in “in Enemy
Defeat in Kunduz,” there are anashid in the background playing where they cover 88.21% of the
theme’s total duration. After further calculations based on Table 4.3.1, 16.87% of anashid in the
background are in Military Training segments, 7.98% in Martyrdom, 45.76% in Conquest and
Military Operation, 7.83% in Oppression and Suffering, 5.64% in Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, and
15.92% in Power Projection.
On the other hand, looking at the utilization of anashid in the foreground, they are more
likely to be found in Military Training segments. This is expected because in Military Training
videos, as seen in A Warning #3, there is a group of men who are participating in military
training to prepare for amaliyah inghimasiyah. Battle sounds, as well as anashid in the
foreground, are observed in the video because the men are practicing their shooting and handling
explosives skills. This suggests that the Taliban emphasizes more on utilizing both anashid in the
foreground and battle sounds than any other Sonic Mode to underline the significance of Military
Training segments. Interestingly, there is a big difference between the observed and expected
value of anashid in the foreground and battleground sounds in Military Training segments with
values of 145.8 minutes observed versus 121.34 minutes expected of anashid in the foreground,
and 125.2 minutes observed versus 90.07 minutes expected in battle sounds. This indicates that
Military Training segments often present fighters during firearm, missile, and explosive training.
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Hence, there is a higher number of observed battleground sounds. It also indicates that the group
chooses to reinforce visual images of Military Training segments by playing anashid in the
foreground and battle sounds more than other Sonic Mode.

The Taliban Difference Between Observed and Expected Values
(Observed - Expected)
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Figure 4.3.1-1 The Taliban Difference Between Observed and Expected Values
Calculating the coverage percentage of anashid in the foreground and battle sounds, one
finds that 36.72% of anashid in the foreground are in Military Training segments, 20.20% in
Martyrdom, 16.16% in Conquest and Military Operation, 6.64% in Oppression and Suffering,
7.03% in Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, and 13.25% in Power Projection segments. As for
battleground sounds, 42.48% are in Military Training segments, 8.97% in Martyrdom, 7.35% in
Conquest and Military Operation, 8.51% in Oppression and Suffering, 16.16% in Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah, 3.77% in Punishment and Execution, and 12.79% in Power Projection. While
28.98% of non-battle sounds coverage percentage exist in Military Training, 6.47% in
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Martyrdom, 20.40% in Conquest and Military Operation, 16.79% in Oppression and Suffering,
6.37% in Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, 6.37% in Punishment and Execution, and 11.26% in Power
Projection.
Interestingly, six themes contain anashid in the background and/or foreground except
Punishment and Execution segments. There are two explanations for the observed results. One,
as explained above, the exclusion of anashid videos might impact the observed number.
Secondly, even though the anashid in the background and anashid in the foreground cover 8.90%
and 24.05% of the total duration of all videos, respectively, the Taliban places their emphasis on
using other Sonic Modes than anashid, such as vocalization, non-battle sounds, and battle sounds
in Punishment and Execution segments.
Moreover, 53.3 observed minutes, compared to 13.35 expected minutes of vocalization, are
in Oppression and Suffering segments. This indicates that vocalization is the Taliban’s preferred
Sonic Mode in Oppression and Suffering segments than any Sonic Mode. Therefore, in the
Taliban videos, it is more likely to find vocalization in Oppression and Suffering segments. On
the other hand, live singing can be seen as one of the Sonic Modes the group uses the least with a
range of 0 to 3.1 minutes, although it is more likely to be found in Military Training and
Martyrdom segments.
In the Oppression and Suffering theme, there is a lower observed value (26.4 minutes)
compared to an expected value (61.35 minutes). One reason for such an observation is due to the
group’s higher emphasis on the visual message and/or message being narrated than playing
anashid in the foreground because doing so might divert the full attention away from the
message and/or images. The same can be said for anashid in the background in Oppression and
Suffering segments. Therefore, it is more likely that the group will choose different sonic
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techniques than foregrounded or backgrounded anashid to convey the message. On the other
hand, vocalization is more prominent in the Oppression and Suffering theme, in which the
observed value is higher than the expected (39.95 minutes difference). That is since the group is
more likely to choose vocalization as a form of Sonic Mode to reinforce the image and message
being broadcasted; emphasis on vocalization more than other Sonic Modes in Oppression and
Suffering segments.
4.3.2

Use of Sonic Modes by ISIS

Table 4.3.2.1 offers an analysis of ISIS videos with an observed and expected number of
duration (in minutes) of each Sonic Mode in common themes with expected values in
parenthesis. Looking at anashid utilization, similar to the Taliban, anashid in the foreground and
battle sounds are more likely to appear in Military Training segments. This indicates that both
ISIS and the Taliban place high emphasis on using anashid in the foreground and battleground
sounds than other Sonic Modes during Military Training segments. In Military Training
segments, the observed values of both anashid in the foreground and battle sounds are greater
than the expected values; anashid in the foreground have an observed value of 25.8 minutes and
expected value of 21.55 minutes, and battleground sounds have an observed value of 20.7
minutes and an expected of 13.80 minutes. This shows that, since Military Training segments
have clips of physical exercises and firearm training, the observed value is higher than the
expected value. Utilizing foregrounded anashid and battle sounds reinforce the visual images in
Military Training segments.
Table 4.3.2 Crosstab of ISIS Utilization of Sonic Modes Across Common Themes
Anashid in
the
Background

Anashid in
the
Foreground

Vocalization

Live
Singing

Non-Battle
Sounds

Battle
Sounds

2.7

25.8

0

1.1

0.8

20.7
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(4.30)

(21.55)

(3.31)

(0.47)

(0.73)

(13.80)

4.9

2.7

6.5

0.4

0

1.3

(2.04)

(10.22)

(1.57)

(0.22)

(0.35)

(6.55)

0.4

19.7

0.3

0

0

14.8

(2.87)

(14.41)

(2.21)

(0.31)

(0.49)

(9.23)

0

0

0.3

0

0

0

(0.04)

(0.19)

(0.03)

(0.00)

(0.01)

(0.12)

5.2

11.9

3.5

0

0.8

5.7

(3.02)

(15.12)

(2.32)

(0.33)

(0.51)

(9.68)

0

0.6

0

0

0

0

(0.08)

(0.41)

(0.06)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.27)

0.5

7.5

0

0

0.8

1.1

(1.24)

(6.21)

(0.95)

(0.14)

(0.21)

(3.98)

χ2 = 61.49

p-value = 0.004

*Expected values are in parenthesis

On the other hand, unlike the Taliban, it is more likely to find anashid in the foreground and
battle sounds than other Sound Modes in ISIS Conquest and Military Operation segments. This
is because the observed value of anashid in the foreground is higher than the expected value in
ISIS videos compared to the Taliban videos (19.7 minutes observed versus 14.41minutes
expected of anashid in the foreground, and 14.8 minutes observed versus 9.23 minutes expected
value of battle sounds). This indicates that ISIS, unlike the Taliban, is more likely to use
foregrounded anashid and battle sounds than other Sonic Modes in Conquest and Military
Operation segments to reinforce the visual content. As for the Taliban, the observed values of
foregrounded anashid and battle sounds are lower than the expected values, indicating that it is
more likely to find other Sonic Modes in Conquest and Military Operation segments. On the
other hand, the Taliban utilizes anashid in the background more than other Sonic Modes in
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Conquest and Military Operation segments to emphasize more on the message than other Sonic
Modes.
For example, in Healing wounds of their nation 7, ISIS introduces the martyr by showing a
clip in slow motion accompanied by anashid in the foreground. Then, anashid are playing in the
background as the martyr expresses his message before the martyrdom operation. Afterward, the
music and battle sounds switch to the foreground as the martyr is riding the bombed vehicle
towards his target combined. On the other hand, in The Continental Heroes, the narrator in the
Taliban video introduces the martyrs with the anashid playing in the background. The following
clip focuses on the martyrs stating their message while the clip does not contain any Sonic
Modes other than the speech. Then, the music switches to the foreground while images of the
martyrs are playing. Afterward, the video shows the martyrdom operation with the only
battleground sounds in the foreground.
Furthermore, ISIS utilizes backgrounded anashid the most in Amaliyat Inghimasiyah
segments, with 37.87% of anashid in the background is under the theme. Looking at Figure
4.3.2-1, since ISIS often utilizes anashid in the background during Martyrdom and Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah segments, the presence of anashid in the background is higher than expected; 2.81
minutes difference in Martyrdom segments and 2.13 minutes in Amaliyat Inghimasiyah
segments. On the other hand, the observed value of backgrounded anashid in Martyrdom and
Amaliyat Inghimasiyah is lower than the expected value in the Taliban segments (Figure 4.3.11). This shows that there is a higher chance of finding other Sonic Modes than anashid in the
background in Martyrdom and Amaliyat Inghimasiyah.
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Figure 4.3.2-1 ISIS Difference Between Observed and Expected Values
Unlike ISIS, it is more likely to find vocalization sounds than other sonic techniques in the
Taliban’s Oppression and Suffering segments (with 39.95 minutes difference between observed
and expected values). In ISIS Martyrdom and Amaliyat Inghimasiyah segments, the observed
value of vocalization is higher than the expected value, indicating that ISIS utilizes vocalization
in Martyrdom and Amaliyat Inghimasiyah segments more than other Sonic Modes. For instance,
in My son has preceded me, at the beginning of the video, the narrator introduces the martyrs
who are sacrificing themselves while playing humming sound in the background and showing
pictures of both civilian causality and ISIS perished martyrs. As the interviewer is asking the
young martyr some questions, vocalization plays in the background. This is followed by more
humming sounds as the martyr is getting inside the bombed truck. Throughout the video, there
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are as many as six references (covering 28.03% of the total duration of the video) of vocalization
in the Martyrdom segments. As described earlier in 4.1.5 Amaliyat Inghimasiyah section, the
video portrays a 14-year-old martyr who drives a bombed pick-up truck to a police checkpoint,
and what is striking is that it is the only video in the ISIS sample that contains vocalization in the
Martyrdom theme. Therefore, future analysis is recommended to distinguish how martyrdom
committed by adolescents is reinforced with Sonic Modes jihadi videos. Thus, even though the
average percentage of vocalization in Martyrdom segments is higher in ISIS videos than in the
Taliban videos (ISIS 28.03% and the Taliban 2.62%), this comparative analysis cannot be fully
thorough because this study does not closely examine the age of martyrs as a theme in the
utilization of Sonic Modes.
When examining live singing in the Taliban and ISIS videos, one notices that both have a
higher live singing observed value than expected value in Military Training videos, a 1.08minute difference in the Taliban, and 0.60 difference in ISIS Military Training segments. This
indicates that, in Military Training segments, both groups are more likely to utilize live singing
(as well as foregrounded anashid and battle sounds) than other Sonic Modes. In Pieslak et al.
study, the authors examine soundtrack elements–anashid, Koranic recitation, and live recitation–
utilized in 755 ISIS videos, and find that the use of live recitation is at 2.1 percent. They
conclude that the usage of both live recitation (and Koranic recitation) holds a “position of
value,” but their usage does not demonstrate “significant and discernable trends over time.”
(Pieslak et al., 2019, p.4)
As for non-battle sounds, in both the Taliban and ISIS videos, it is more likely to find nonbattle sounds than other Sonic Modes in Power Projection segments since the observed values
are higher than the expected values. These segments are when the groups show their military
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capabilities and spoils-of-war. Also, it is less likely to find non-battle sounds in Martyrdom, and
Conquest and Military Operation segments of both the Taliban and ISIS since the observed value
is less than the expected value.
4.3.3

Use of Sonic Modes by AQAP

Table 4.3.3.1 offers an analysis of AQAP videos with an observed and expected number of
duration (in minutes) of each Sonic Mode in common themes with expected values in
parenthesis. Looking carefully at the use of anashid in the background in AQAP videos, one can
notice that it is more likely to find them in Martyrdom, and Oppression and Suffering segments
than in other themes. This indicates that the group prefers highlighting the message being
conveyed by placing the anashid in the background but not fully removing the anashid
soundtrack from the segments. For instance, in an AQAP video, Repulsion of Aggression 5, there
is a series of martyrdom operations to fight off the aggression of the enemy. As the martyrs
stating their message, there are anashid playing in the background.
Looking at Figure 4.3.3-1, compared to other Sonic Modes, there is a higher chance of
finding anashid in the background in Martyrdom and Amaliyat Inghimasiyah segments for both
ISIS and AQAP, since the observed values are higher than expected values (a difference between
the observed and expected value of 2.81 minutes in ISIS segments and 0.72 minutes in AQAP
segments). Moreover, in the Taliban and AQAP videos, the observed value of backgrounded
anashid in Oppression and Suffering, and Punishment and Execution segments is lower than the
expected value. This indicates that there is a higher probability of finding other Sonic Modes
than anashid in the background to reinforce the visual image, such as vocalization and non-battle
sounds.
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Table 4.3.3 Crosstab of AQAP Utilization of Sonic Modes Across Common Themes

Military
Training
Martyrdom
Conquest and
Military
Operation
Oppression
and Suffering
Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah
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and Execution
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Projection
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Non-Battle
Sounds
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Sounds

6.7

5.7

0.1

0

0

6.8

(6.66)

(4.40)

(0.83)

(0.08)

(0.53)

(2.63)

29.5

10.7

0.1

0.4

0

1.6

(21.69)

(14.32)

(2.69)

(0.27)

(1.73)

(8.57)

6.3

12.8

0.1

0.4

0

11.2

(10.43)

(6.89)

(1.30)

(0.13)

(0.83)

(4.12)

30.3

17.0

10.4

0.4

4.5

6.1

(33.27)

(21.96)

(4.13)

(0.42)

(2.66)

(13.14)

17.0

11.1

0.4

0

2.1

8.1

(16.28)

(10.75)

(2.02)

(0.21)

(1.30)

(6.43)

1.6

1.2

0

0

0.8

1.9

(1.89)

(1.25)

(0.23)

(0.02)

(0.15)

(0.75)

0.6

2.2

0.3

0

0

0.6

(1.66)

(1.10)

(0.21)

(0.02)

(0.13)

(0.66)

χ2 = 68.37

p-value = 0.035

*Expected values are in parenthesis

As for videos produced by ISIS and AQAP, the observed value of anashid in the background
in Conquest and Military Operation and Power Projection segments is lower than the expected
value. This means that there is a higher chance that the two groups utilize other Sonic Modes,
such as foregrounded anashid and battle sounds, to get their message across. Calculating the
percentage of backgrounded anashid coverage in AQAP videos, one finds that 7.26% of anashid
in the background fall under Military Training segments, 32.06% in Martyrdom, 6.84% in
Conquest and Military Operation, 32.92% in Oppression and Suffering, 18.50% in Amaliyat
Inghimasiyah, 1.76% in Punishment and Execution, and 0.65% in Power Projection. Therefore,
both ISIS and AQAP’s Martyrdom segments contain the majority of anashid in the background.
On the other hand, the Taliban emphasizes more on using anashid in the background in Conquest
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and Military Operation segments (45.76% of anashid in the background can be found in
Conquest and Military Operation).

AQAP Difference Between Observed and Expected Values (Observed Expected)
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Figure 4.3.3-1 AQAP Difference Between Observed and Expected Values

On the other hand, 27.92% of anashid in the foreground is found in AQAP Oppression and
Suffering segments. This is different in the Taliban and ISIS case because the highest percentage
of foregrounded anashid (36.72% and 37.89% respectively) are in Military Training segments. In
all three groups, there is a higher chance to find anashid in the foreground than other Sonic forms
in Military Training, Conquest and Military Operation, and Power Projection segments because
the observed value is higher than the expected value. This implies that segments containing
physical and firearms training, raids, and spoils-of-war are more likely to contain anashid in the
foreground than other Sonic Modes.
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Looking at vocalization and live singing, 91.23% of vocalization falls under the Oppression
and Suffering theme, and the percentage of minute-duration of live singing is almost divided in
thirds between Martyrdom, Conquest and Military Operation, and Oppression and Suffering. In
which 35.83% of live singing falls under Martyrdom, 30.58% under Conquest and Military
Training, and 30.58% under Oppression and Suffering. Compared to the Taliban, AQAP also
uses the highest percentage of vocalization in Oppression and Suffering segments, since these
segments portray visual images of civilian casualty.
When observing the use of vocalization in all three groups, there is a higher chance of
finding vocalization in Oppression and Suffering segments since the observed value is higher
than the expected value. On the other hand, one is more likely to observe other Sonic Modes than
vocalization in Military Training (e.g., foregrounded anashid and battle sounds in all three
groups) and Conquest and Military Operation (anashid in the foreground and battle sounds in
ISIS and AQAP segments). Furthermore, there is a higher chance of noticing live singing
(combined with backgrounded anashid in the case of ISIS and AQAP) in Martyrdom segments
amongst the three groups because the observed value is higher than the expected value. Also, in
Amaliyat Inghimasiyah segments of all three groups, there is a higher chance of observing other
Sonic Modes (e.g., in Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, backgrounded anashid in ISIS and AQAP
segments, and battle sounds in the Taliban and AQAP segments) than live singing.
When exploring non-battle sounds and battle sounds in AQAP videos, the majority of nonbattle sounds percentage (61.41%) falls under Oppression and Suffering segments. In
comparison, 28.53% falls under Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, and 10.73% is under Punishment and
Execution. Also, the majority of battle sounds percentage (30.90%) falls under Conquest and
Military Operation while 22.31% is under Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, 18.82% under Military
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Training, 16.80% under Oppression and Suffering, 5.10% under Punishment and Execution,
4.41% under Martyrdom, and 1.65% under Power Projection. The results are expected since nonbattle sounds contain sounds of people shouting, and Oppression and Suffering segments often
cover citizens’ reaction to civilian casualty due to airstrikes.
Comparing the three groups, there is a higher chance of finding battleground sounds (along
with anashid in the foreground) in Military Training segments than other Sonic Modes, since the
observed values in all three groups are higher than the expected values. Also, there is an
increased probability of finding other Sonic Modes than battle sounds in the groups’ Martyrdom
as well as Oppression and Suffering segments because the observed values are lower than the
expected values. Other Sonic Modes include foregrounded anashid in the Taliban Martyrdom
segments and backgrounded anashid in ISIS and AQAP’s Martyrdom segments. On the other
hand, there is a higher probability of finding other Sonic Modes (e.g., in Conquest and Military
Operation segments, backgrounded anashid in the Taliban and foregrounded anashid and battle
sounds in ISIS and AQAP segments) than non-battle sounds in Martyrdom as well as Conquest
and Military Operation segments of the three groups.
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5

SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS

This study has systematically examined the audiovisual messages in video production by the
Taliban, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula. To explore
the similarities and differences in the utilization of audiovisual messages amongst the three
groups, this study explored the multimodal communication strategies to analyze the audiovisual
channel of communication in jihadi videos. Doing so encourages a more accurate analysis of
information-sharing channels that jihadi groups use to reach their targeted audience. Therefore,
the examination of 118 videos led to the emergence of common visual themes utilized by the
three groups. Such themes are Military Training, Martyrdom, Conquest and Military Operation,
Oppression and Suffering, Amaliyat Inghimasiyah, Punishment and Execution, and Power
Projection.
This study finds that both the Taliban and ISIS place their emphasis on content that falls
under Military Training and Conquest and Military Operation more than other themes; the
Taliban focuses more on Conquest and Military Operation theme. One possible reason for the
Taliban’s high emphasis on Conquest and Military Operation theme is, as reported by Giustozzi
(2018), several donors who previously supported the Taliban (and al-Qa’ida) financially are now
supporting the Islamic State in Khorasan because the Taliban “did not see as many achievements
as was expected from them.” (Giustozzi, 2018, p.168) Therefore, to attract donors back to
support the Taliban, the group has to increase its achievements as well as document it.
Additionally, ISIS places the most emphasis on the Military Training theme. Such a result is
predictable because many studies report observing the prominence of Military Training theme in
ISIS propaganda videos. Such studies include (Besenyö & Mayer, 2015; Shamieh & Szenes,
2015; Winkler & Pieslak, 2018). On the other hand, AQAP places high significance on content
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that falls under Oppression and Suffering, unlike the Taliban and ISIS, who puts a lower
emphasis on covering the theme. The victim narrative in AQAP videos (Stenersen, 2017) is
driven by the need to establish “collective dignity and social justice.” (Chapman & Adelman,
2011, p.9)
Within these themes, looking at the utilization of Sonic Modes in the Taliban videos, the
group is more likely to use anashid in the background in Conquest and Military Operation and
foregrounded anashid in the Military Training segments. Utilizing backgrounded anashid
indicates that the group emphasizes more on the message being narrated than the music but still
values the music’s prominence in their production by placing them in the background. However,
using foregrounded anashid signals the group’s choice to reinforce the visual image with the
sonic element by allowing the sonic element to dominate the perception. Also, vocalization
segments are mostly found in Oppression and Suffering segments. This indicates the group's
need to reinforce the visual image of oppressed citizens with humming sounds. Battle sounds,
non-battle sounds, and live singing of anashid are more likely to be found in Military Training
segments.
Looking at ISIS utilization of Sonic Modes in common themes, there is a higher chance of
finding backgrounded anashid in Amaliyat Inghimasiyah and Martyrdom segments than finding
other Sonic Modes. In Military Training segments, similar to the Taliban, one is more likely to
find anashid in the foreground and battle sounds than other sonic techniques. Moreover, in
AQAP videos, it is more likely to find the highest percentage of backgrounded and foregrounded
anashid, vocalization, and non-battle sounds in Oppression and Suffering. But it is more likely to
find battle sounds in Conquest and Military Operation.
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Even though the three groups utilize common themes and essentially similar sonic
techniques in their video, i.e., music utilization, vocalization, and battle and non-battled sounds,
still, there are discrepancies within the utilization of common themes and sonic elements in the
videos. These discrepancies show what visual content is considered the most important for each
group and with what sonic element to reinforce such content; implying that the groups are of
different nature and with dissimilar aims. For instance, while the Taliban place their emphasis on
reinforcing Conquest and Military Operation segments with sonic elements, ISIS places most of
their focus on Military Training segments, and AQAP underlines Oppression and Suffering
segments. Their differences reflect their aims and identity; the Taliban aims to please their
financial donors by raiding and taking over a target (Giustozzi, 2018), while ISIS is focusing on
state-building (Lahoud, 2017) by utilizing Sonic Modes to reinforce the physical strength,
identity, and unification of the members in the group. Additionally, AQAP emphasizes the most
on Oppression and Suffering content to reinforce the notion of who are the evil forces and why
they should be stopped. Even though these groups utilize similar sonic elements to highlight their
messages, they choose to focus on themes differently and for different reasons.
Also, examining the low thematic coverage of each group, one notices that ISIS focuses the
least on the Oppression and Suffering theme compared to the Taliban, and especially AQAP,
who emphasizes the most on victim narratives. One explanation for such an observation is
because, compared to the Taliban and AQAP, ISIS emphasizes the most on state-building and
how the group is achieving that goal. Therefore, highlighting themes like Military Training, and
Conquest and Military Operation allows the group to be perceived as achieving their highly
publicized goal; i.e., building a strong, unified state. On the other hand, the low emphasis on
Oppression and Suffering content shows that the group is not only focusing on result-oriented
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effort, but it is paying less attention to content that might draw negative attention to the
ineffective efforts to establish the Islamic State.
Interestingly, on the other hand, AQAP emphasizes the least on the Military Training theme
(4.86% of the total duration of themes covered) compared to the Taliban and ISIS (24.54% and
29.25% respectively). By emphasizing more on the victim narrative, AQAP is showing less
content that might counter the effect of victim narrative, such as the military superiority of its
members. Despite the fact that the Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP are jihadi organizations that utilize
different communication strategies to disseminate their messages to a relatively similar audience.
Regardless of using a similar information-sharing channel, these groups compete amongst
themselves to attract a specific audience by emphasizing on different themes to maximize the
impact of their message
Furthermore, by identifying which theme each group focuses on the most through using the
reinforcement mechanism of sonic elements in producing an easier and quicker to process visual
content, analysts can focus their attention and effort on messages that are easier to process and
quicker to process. This is especially important for analysts working to counter violent
extremism because producing successful anti-propaganda videos depends on utilizing similar
techniques as those used by jihadi groups. Therefore, exploring the discrepancies within the
utilization of sonic elements in the common themes allows for producing successful antipropaganda videos aimed at countering the narratives of a specific group.
For scholars, online responders, policymakers, and those examining jihadi media products,
this research has two important implications. First, examining multimodal messages in jihadi
videos is essential to effectively study how jihadi organizations use multimodal communication
strategies to disseminate their messages to the targeted audience. Focusing on one mode of
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communication (often textual) could contribute to misunderstanding the groups’ messaging
strategies. After all, language is a multimodal semiotic system that is “a collection of signs or
symbols to be deployed and construct more complex meanings.” (Lemke, 2012, p.79) By
analyzing themes that are reinforced by sonic elements, such as Conquest and Military Operation
in the Taliban videos, Military Training in ISIS videos, and Oppression and Suffering in AQAP
videos, those studying jihadi media campaigns can focus attention on content that is easier to
remember and process (Winkler & Pieslak, 2018).
Second, the lack of multimodal analysis of jihadi videos is illustrated by Allendorfer and
Herring in a study that examines the effectiveness of ISIS and the U.S. Department of State
(USDS) propaganda videos through multimodal analysis, ISIS propaganda videos succeeded in
capturing the targeted audience’s attention because of their ability to identify and appeal with
their audience. On the other hand, the USDS propaganda videos are deemed ineffective because
of presentation techniques and content of videos, in which the utilization of instrumental music is
featured in every USDS video (Allendorfer & Herring, 2015). Their study shows that for an
effective evaluation of how the group presents their messages, those in the field should pursue
exploring how the utilization of various information-sharing channels, such as the visual, textual,
sonic, etc. influence the presentation of messages.
Although this study systematically analyzes the audiovisual messaging strategies in the
Taliban, ISIS, and AQAP, there are some limitations to keep in mind. One, this study
investigates the audiovisual messages of the three groups and overlooks the examination of two
prominent messaging strategies in jihadi videos, i.e., text embedded in videos and
cinematographic techniques. Jihadi groups utilize text on the screen to introduce a person, switch
between sections by inserting the group’s logo or video’s title, or Quran verses. While it is
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important to study the audiovisual messages, it is also important to examine the text within jihadi
videos to increase the understanding of different messaging techniques by adding an extra layer
of multimodality to jihadi video analysis. Second, since this study does not include anashid
videos, the results of Punishment and Execution theme are lower than expected (observed value
is lower than expected), especially the observed value of Punishment and Execution in ISIS
videos. There are many studies focusing on the graphic images of ISIS (Euben, 2017; Friis,
2015; Mahood & Rane, 2017), and as stated before, one possible explanation is the exclusion of
anashid videos from the analysis. Therefore, before drawing a definitive conclusion, future
studies distinguishing between non-anashid videos and anashid videos are helpful in elaborating
further on how each group utilizes anashid techniques in different themes.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Appendix A - The Taliban Video Title, Duration, and Length

1

A Brilliant Id Release-Badri Lashkar 1

11/11/11

1:08:55

Length (in
minutes)
68.9

2

Badri Lashkar #2

7/23/12

1:08:56

68.9

3

Badri Lashkar #3

8/3/13

1:08:04

68.1

4

Badri Lashkar #4

2/9/14

1:26:19

86.3

5

Liberation of Dashti Archi

6/26/15

7:02

7

6

11/11/16

1:19:28

79.5

3/26/17

9:42

9.1

3/30/17

7:48

7.8

4/4/17

8:12

8.2

8/20/17

3:17

3.3

11

Badri Lashkar #6
Bombing that Killed Children at the Ceremony in
Ghazni Province
Latest Trends of the Mujahidin in Alingar District of
Laghman Province
Indeed is the Falsehood [by nature], Ever Bound to
Depart
Brotherhood of the Mujahidin Ahmad Khilai District of
the Paktia Province
Health and Wellbeing #2

3/4/18

9:59

10

12

The Honorable Way

3/7/18

30:08:00

38

13

Enemy Savagery in Khakrez

3/11/18

18:00

18

14

Latest Conquests in Ghazni

3/13/18

10:23

18.4

15

A Warning #3

3/15/18

50

50

16

Education and Learning #11

3/17/18

8:42

8.7

17

Successful Operations in Farah

3/18/18

39:15:00

39.3

18

Mujahidin Raid

3/21/18

9:44

9.7

19

Clashes against the Hirelings in Ghir

3/27/18

6:53

6.9

20

Enemy Barbarity in Dashte Archi in Kunduz Province

4/3/18

23:02

23

21

The Continental Heroes

4/4/18

36:38:00

36.6

22

The Enemy Lies

4/5/18

5:01

5

23

Barbarity of Hirelings Against a Defenseless Nation

4/7/18

28:13:00

28.2

24

The Fronts of Martyrdom

4/8/18

13:25

13.4

25

Aiding the Needy Countrymen #2

4/10/18

17:46

17.8

26

Enemy Defeat in Farah

4/12/18

18:40

18.7

27

Protests Against the Shocking Event of Kunduz

4/17/18

8:00

8

28

Fresh Conquests in Ghazni's Wilderness

4/19/18

1:44

1.7

29

Latest Conquests in Zabul

4/23/18

6:14

6.2

30

Enemy Barbarity in Bala Bluk

4/24/18

5:26

5.4

31

New Advances in Ghazni

4/26/18

6:10

6.2

Number

7
8
9
10

Title

Date

Duration

58

32

Mujahidin Raids on Check Points in Balkh and Paktia
Great Mujahidin Successes in Takhar to Welcome alKhandaq Operations
From the Fronts of Spin Ghar

4/27/18

7:02

7

4/30/18

8:51

8.9

5/6/18

8:54

8.9

5/6/18

8:37

8.6

5/8/18

3:31

3.5

37

Hazrat Abu Bakr
About the Closure of the Ghazni Paktika Highway for
the Enemy
Jihadi Conquests in Baglan

5/14/18

5:54

5.9

38

Latest Jihadi Situation in Ghazni

5/17/18

12:04

12.1

39

Kunduz’s Bleeding Horror

5/21/18

57:18:00

57.3

40

Interview with Mulla Muhammad Daud Muzamill

5/28/18

15:28

15.5

41

Interview with Haji Yusuf

5/29/18

14:01

14

42

Jihad Situation in Chora

5/30/18

14:20

14.3

43

Aid Distribution to Needy Countrymen #3

6/2/18

10:01

10

44

Life in Jihad #3

6/4/18

26:52:00

26.9

45

Report about Weapons and Ammunition

6/5/18

2:18

2.3

46

6/6/18

16:08

16.1

6/7/18

8:40

8.7

48

Ghazni Patika Highway
Interview with Reconciled Police Chief of Pur Chaman
District
Education and Learning #12

6/7/18

14:35

14.6

49

Conquests and Achievements in Tala Wa Barfak

6/9/18

11:14

11.2

50

Conquest of Chora (Uruzgan Province)

6/10/18

13:16

13.3

51

6/11/18

11:14

11.2

6/12/18

9:17

9.3

53

Liberation of Jaghatu
In Helmand Thirteen Prisoners Released From Prison On
the Occasion of ‘Īd
Takeover of Key Base in Maruf (Kandahar Province)

6/12/18

4:55

4.9

54

Umari Army

6/14/18

44:21:00

44.4

55

Jihādī Advances in Ghazni

6/15/18

26:10:00

26.2

56

Īd of the Nation and Mujāhidīn #3

6/22/18

8:19

8.3

57

Jihādī Advances in Baghdis

6/26/18

2:24

2.4

58

Enemy Savagery in Baghdis

6/28/18

3:23

3.4

59

Operational Actions in Farah Province

6/29/18

2:41

2.7

60

Recent Conquests in Zabul

7/1/18

7:09

7.2

61

Aid Distribution to Needy Countrymen #4

7/4/18

15:45

15.8

62

Real Men #3

7/7/18

21:06

21.1

63

Conquests in Balkh

7/9/18

12:58

13

64

Gate of Kabul and Convoy of Conquests

7/12/18

32:30:00

32.5

65

The Latest Victories of the Mujāhidīn in Khogyani

7/14/18

7:44

7.7

66

What Really Transpired in Zurmat and Nangarhar

7/16/18

22:50

22.8

67

Education and Training #13

7/19/18

8:00

8

68

Enemy Savagery in the Zabul Campaign

7/21/18

9:05

9.1

33
34
35
36

47

52

59

73

Distribution of the ‘Īd Message on the Occasion of ‘Īd
al-Fiṭr
Latest Conquests in Badakhshan
Distribution of the Message of the Leader of the Faithful
#2
Distribution of the Message of the Leader of the Faithful
#3
Soldiers in Kundiz Join the Mujāhidīn With Weapons

74

Arrest in Helmand With a Car and Money

8/2/18

6:53

6.9

75

Successful Operations at the Gate of Kabul

8/2/18

13:02

12

76

Enemy Defeat in Ghazni

8/7/18

13:05

13.1

77

Enemy Barbarity in Farah Rod

8/8/18

5:23

5.4

78

Latest Conquests in Ghazni

8/11/18

6:12

6.2

79

18 Soldiers Join the Mujāhidīn in Paktia

8/13/18

2:15

2.3

80

Report on Ghazni

8/14/18

2:00

2

81

The Conquest of Ghazni

8/14/18

12:06

12.1

82

The Conquest of Dih Yak

8/16/18

12:12

12.2

83

8/18/18

4:26

4.4

8/18/18

8:13

4.2

85

Interview with Imprisoned Police in Farah
About the Closure of Roads in Front of the Enemy in
Maidan Wardak and Zabul Provinces
Clearing Dā’ish From Darzah

8/19/18

4:40

4.7

86

Victorious Operations in the Zabul Capital

8/19/18

8:23

8.4

87

Convoy of Conquest #12

8/19/18

1:12:19

72.3

88

8/20/18

6:54

6.9

8/20/18

22:39

22.7

90

Enemy Defeat in Kunduz
Release of Prisoners of War On the Occasion of ‘Īd in
Ghazni
Distribution of the Message of the Leader of the Faithful

8/21/18

6:02

6

91

Education and Training #14

8/21/18

5:14

5.2

92

Badri Lashkar #5

8/31/18

1:35:18

95.3

93

Enemy Retreat From Shomolzo (Zabul)

9/10/18

9:30

9.5

94

Conquests in Qarabagh (Ghazni)

9/11/18

12:53

12.9

95

Mujāhidīn Operations in the Ghaziabad District

9/11/18

6:06

6.1

69
70
71
72

84

89

7/23/18

14:01

14

7/26/18

4:49

4.8

7/27/18

3:32

3.5

7/27/18

9:45

9.8

7/29/18

2:41

2.7

60

Appendix B
Appendix B - ISIS Video Title, Duration, and Length
Title
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Victory from God and an imminent conquest
The nectar of life
Healing wounds of their nation 7
Abo Isa training camp
The Martyr’s message
Message to the Medical Professionals
Upon You Oh Tyrants of the Arabian Peninsula
Terrify the Enemy of God and Your Enemy
Rather, They Are Alive with Their Lord
My son has preceded me
The good men
The raid of Suhayb al Iraqi

13

The light

Date

Duration

5/11/15
6/16/15
8/19/15
8/30/15
11/7/15
11/8/15
12/16/15
1/3/16
1/9/16
2/19/16
2/23/16
3/13/16
Unknow
n

12:29
9:23
3:39
8:49
5:42
6:03
21:04
21:10
10:29
23:06
9:01
14:34

Length (in
minutes)
12.5
9.4
3.6
8.8
5.7
6.1
21.1
21.2
10.5
23.1
9
14.6

21:30

21.5

Date

Length

11/11/10
3/7/14
5/28/14
7/29/14
11/9/16
4/20/17
5/2/17
4/20/18
4/23/18

31:23:00
31:20:00
11:19
12:00
29:51:00
20:18
15:13
30:54:00
20:58

Duration
(in
minutes)
31.4
31.3
11.3
12
29.9
20.3
15.2
30.9
21

9/4/18

40:55:00

40.9

Appendix C
Appendix C - AQAP Video Title, Duration, and Length
Title
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Repulsion of Aggression 1
Repulsion of Aggression 3
Repulsion of Aggression 4
Repulsion of Aggression 5
Repulsion of Aggression 6
America and Its Latest Trap 2
Repulsion of Aggression 7
Repulsion of Aggression 9
Repulsion of Aggression 10
The Preliminary Introduction of Demolishing the
Espionage

